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Failure to Connect the Dots, 50 Years Later: “Yom Kippur War” (1973) Versus “October 7”
Abstract
Hamas-led attack on Israel (October 7, 2023) was considered to be a spectacular military surprise similar to the “Yom Kippur War” (1973). There are parallel lines to the attack and the war, most of them in the field of intelligence, such as ignoring intelligence reports and failure to connect the dots, i.e., failing to interpret the large amounts of data accumulated in the intelligence division, and identified in the two events, that a war was about to break out. Israeli intelligence also failed in both wars by sticking to the wrong concepts. According to the first case study (“The 1973 War”), the Egyptian and the Syrian armies would not start a war because the Israeli military had remarkably won the “1967 War”. According to the second case study (Hamas-led attack on Israel), “Hamas is deterred,” and the conflict between Israel and the Hamas organization controlling in Gaza strip, could be contained by Israel. Though both conceptions were incorrect, they prevented political and military decision-makers and heads of the IDF from “reading” the intelligence reports, which explicitly described the most likely option of war and attack in both situations. In the research, a top-tier intelligence agency, the IDF intelligence, failed miserably to connect the dots twice, 50 years apart. In our research, the “Yom Kippur War” and the Hamas-led attack on Israel (October 7, 2023) are compared using a close tables and artificial intelligence.
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