Mathematical Treatment for Constructing a countermeasure against the one time pad attack on the Baptista Type Cryptosystem

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Author(s): M.R.K. Ariffin (Universiti Putra Malaysia, Malaysia)and M.S.M. Noorani (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia)
Copyright: 2011
Pages: 13
Source title: Chaos Synchronization and Cryptography for Secure Communications: Applications for Encryption
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Santo Banerjee (Politecnico di Torino, Italy)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61520-737-4.ch020

Keywords: Information Science Reference / Information Security & Privacy / IT Security and Ethics / Security & Forensics

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Abstract

In 1998, M.S. Baptista proposed a chaotic cryptosystem using the ergodicity property of the simple lowdimensional and chaotic logistic equation. Since then, many cryptosystems based on Baptista’s work have been proposed. However, over the years research has shown that this cryptosystem is predictable and vulnerable to attacks and is widely discussed. Among the weaknesses are the non-uniform distribution of ciphertexts and succumbing to the one-time pad attack (a type of chosen plaintext attack). In this chapter the authors give a mathematical treatment to the phenomenon such that the cryptosystem would no longer succumb to the one-time pad attack and give an example that satisfies it.

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Mathematical Treatment for Constructing a countermeasure against the one time pad attack on the Baptista Type Cryptosystem

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