Automatic Security Analysis of SAML-Based Single Sign-On Protocols

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Author(s): Alessandro Armando (University of Genova, Italy & Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Italy), Roberto Carbone (Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Italy), Luca Compagna (SAP Research Sophia-Antipolis, France)and Giancarlo Pellegrino (SAP Research Sophia-Antipolis, France & Eurécom, France)
Copyright: 2012
Pages: 20
Source title: Digital Identity and Access Management: Technologies and Frameworks
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Raj Sharman (State University of New York, USA), Sanjukta Das Smith (State University of New York-Buffalo, USA)and Manish Gupta (State University of New York at Buffalo, USA)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61350-498-7.ch010

Keywords: Biometrics / Information Science Reference / IT Security and Ethics / Medicine & Healthcare

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Abstract

Single-Sign-On (SSO) protocols enable companies to establish a federated environment in which clients sign in the system once and yet are able to access to services offered by different companies. The OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile is the emerging standard in this context. In previous work a severe security flaw in the SAML-based SSO for Google Apps was discovered. By leveraging this experience, this chapter will show that model checking techniques for security protocols can support the development and analysis of SSO solutions helping the designer not only to detect serious security flaws early in the development life-cycle but also to provide assurance on the security of the solutions identified.

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Automatic Security Analysis of SAML-Based Single Sign-On Protocols

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