Chapter 1
Artificial Ethics

Laura L. Pană
Polytechnic University of Bucharest, Romania

ABSTRACT

We live in a partially artificial intelligent environment in which human intelligent agents are accompanied and assisted by artificial intelligent agents, continually endowed with more functions, skills, and even competences, and having a more significant involvement and influence in the social environment. Therefore, artificial agents need to become and moral agents. Human and artificial intelligent agents are cooperating in various complex activities, and thus, they develop some common characteristics and properties. These features, in turn, are changing and progressing together with several increasing requirements of the different types of activities. All these changes produce a common evolution of human and artificial intelligent agents. Under these new conditions, human and artificial agents need a shared ethics. Artificial ethics can be philosophically grounded, scientifically developed, and technically implemented, and it will be a more clear, coherent, and consistent ethics, suitable for both human and artificial moral agents, and will be the first effective ethics.

INTRODUCTION

The possibility to conceive and to effectively apply a new ethics, deeply explicit and valid in theory, strongly relevant in practice, and suitable for both artificial and human intelligent agents is argued in this chapter.

The whole intellectual history shows that long ago humans were aware of their specific gift to add artificial objects of social (material or ideal) kind to those natural, i.e. to create culture, as an extension of nature. The oldest cyberneticist, Plato, in his *Republic*, offered the first description of society as a human design and an artificial product. Aristotle, in his turn, wrote in *Politics* (II. 5) about the automatic tools and installations of Daedal and even about the mentally controlled tripods created by Hephaestus, which served the "band" of gods.

For the specific field of moral culture, P. Danielson outlined the artificiality of morals and analyzed the possible degrees of creativity by which moral values are invented and moral culture is renewed (Danielson, 1998). He explicitly writes: "important parts of morality are artificial cognitive and social

devices" (p.292). Even before, J. Bentham, who explored both the human mind and the *Table of Springs of Action* (1812), understood the artificial character of morality and described "the whole fabric of morals". He elaborated a both comprehensive and operational moral theory, and coined a specific calculus, based on the central moral value of his vision.

This study identifies theoretical possibilities to model moral conduct, and aims to find and to develop a set of moral prerequisites (mental aptitudes and practical skills), available and suitable for any kind of moral agents. In this way, the axiological foundation of the new ethics may be continued by an attempt to identify an appropriate and operable value-set, selected from a complete ethical system.

The main practical contributions covered by chapter: indicates a well-founded way to effectively connect moral theory and moral practice; proposes a complex but feasible strategy of designing artificial moral agents, detailed in a few operational phases; makes a concrete proposal of modeling and implementing moral action in the behavior of artificial agents; shows the new possibilities offered by the present changes in value systems for effective moral agents designing and training.

BACKGROUND: SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES OF ARTIFICIAL ETHICS

Some theoretical deficiencies of great ethical systems and some practical difficulties of applying abstract moral values in concrete conditions by individual agents have been frequently discussed by ethicists, in their common effort to establish a new foundational theory of moral choice, moral freedom and then of a deep moral conduct.

The nature of artificial agents able to behave ethically has been extensively studied. This study leaded to different conclusions, which can however be considered convergent. Among other features of moral agents McDermott emphasizes the capacity to take specific, moral decisions, just like (Moor, 2005 and 2011), and analyses ethical reasoning, seen as the main decisional sub-structure (McDermott, 2011). The role of free will is also detailed by him, while the will itself is refined up to temptation. J. Gips also emphasizes the role of free will, as of conscious choice (Gips, 2011), and shows the necessity to develop perceptual and non-symbolic aspects of morality, and to favor training, not teaching of abstract theories. (p. 250). Wallach and Allen correlated autonomy and sensitivity (to moral considerations) as defining dimensions for artificial moral agents (Wallach & Allen, 2009). For J. P. Sullins, the relevant aspects of moral agency are autonomy, intentionality and responsibility (Sullins, 2006). L. Floridi studies the distribution of the necessary factors for an ethical behavior - interactivity, autonomy and adaptability -, between a large category of agents, such as natural objects, ecosystems, technical systems, organizations and humans. Intentionality is also associated, as the most important, responsibility, which is here distinguished from accountability (Floridi, 2011, p. 205). The list of the required capacities is also extended in (Anderson, 2011) by sentience, self-consciousness, reasoning, and emotionality. Moral agency is also considered here, although some of the above indicated elements are integrated into the very internal structure of action, as aspects or parts of interests, motivations, decisions and goals. Other authors dedicated to define agency include, among other features, normativity and asymmetry (Barandiaran, Paolo, & Rohde, 2009). Spatio-temporality, also assigned to agents by them, actually is a universal property. Moral agent's study, as part of the artificial intelligent agent's theory, may be illustrated including by (Pană, 2005c), a study on artificial cognitive agents, followed by (Pană, 2008b), on cognitive and moral agents, viewed in their evolution (Pană, 2006b). This chapter continues and deepens the growing list

10 more pages are available in the full version of this document, which may be purchased using the "Add to Cart" button on the publisher's webpage: www.igi-global.com/chapter/artificial-ethics/213113

Related Content

A Lisibility Assessment for Mobile Phones

Francisco V. Cipolla-Ficarra, Jacqueline Almaand Jim Carré (2018). *Technology-Enhanced Human Interaction in Modern Society (pp. 103-121).*

www.irma-international.org/chapter/a-lisibility-assessment-for-mobile-phones/189839

Lack of Naturalness in Human-Computer Interactions

(2018). *Experience-Based Human-Computer Interactions: Emerging Research and Opportunities (pp. 9-46).*

www.irma-international.org/chapter/lack-of-naturalness-in-human-computer-interactions/190282

A Unified Framework for Internet Banking Adoption: Indian Perspective

Rahmath Safeenaand Abdullah Kammani (2018). *Technology Adoption and Social Issues: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications (pp. 371-388).*

www.irma-international.org/chapter/a-unified-framework-for-internet-banking-adoption/196685

Digital Divide

Patrick Flanagan (2019). *Advanced Methodologies and Technologies in Artificial Intelligence, Computer Simulation, and Human-Computer Interaction (pp. 737-748).*

www.irma-international.org/chapter/digital-divide/213173

Uniform Random Number Generation With Jumping Facilities

E. Jack Chen (2019). *Advanced Methodologies and Technologies in Artificial Intelligence, Computer Simulation, and Human-Computer Interaction (pp. 337-349).*

www.irma-international.org/chapter/uniform-random-number-generation-with-jumping-facilities/213139