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Successfully Playing Games of Tax Compliance: Government Agencies as Architects of Public Choice
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of government in encouraging fiscal compliance from the theoretical perspective of the ‘Ecology of Games'. Conceptual representations of human behaviour in formal complex institutions, located within Behavioural Economics Political Game Theory, presuppose it is possible for government agencies to strategically influence the behavioural preferences and consumption patterns of individual actors and groups in society. This study presents an empirical case concerned with the implementation and use of an electronic property tax collection system in Bangalore, India developed between 1998 and 2008.
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