IRMA-International.org: Creator of Knowledge
Information Resources Management Association
Advancing the Concepts & Practices of Information Resources Management in Modern Organizations

Institutional Investors' Representativeness and Earnings Management: Evidence From a High Ownership Concentration Context

Institutional Investors' Representativeness and Earnings Management: Evidence From a High Ownership Concentration Context
View Sample PDF
Author(s): Pietro Fera (University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy), Nicola Moscariello (University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy), Michele Pizzo (University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy)and Giorgio Ricciardi (University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy)
Copyright: 2021
Pages: 19
Source title: Comparative Research on Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and Economic Value
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Elisabete S. Vieira (University of Aveiro, Portugal), Mara Madaleno (University of Aveiro, Portugal)and Graça Azevedo (University of Aveiro, Portugal)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-7596-3.ch002

Purchase


Abstract

In contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, institutional investors may lose their monitoring role and might not be effective in constraining earnings management. So, this study investigates whether directors appointed by institutional shareholders are more effective in inhibiting earnings management for companies with a high ownership concentration, rather than the mere presence of institutional investors. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, findings suggest a negative relationship between minority directors appointed by institutional shareholders and abnormal accruals, while no relationship is found between the latter and the mere presence of institutional investors. Moreover, results also highlight that the difference between strategic and no strategic institutional investors does not count in a context characterized by high ownership concentration. Overall, this study suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their characteristics, are more effective in constraining earnings management when they can count on an agent on the board of directors.

Related Content

Sonal Linda. © 2024. 24 pages.
Yasmin Yousaf Mossa, Peter Smith, Kathleen Ann Bland. © 2024. 40 pages.
Ugochukwu Okwudili Matthew, Jazuli Sanusi Kazaure, Charles Chukwuebuka Ndukwu, Godwin Nse Ebong, Andrew Chinonso Nwanakwaugwu, Ubochi Chibueze Nwamouh. © 2024. 29 pages.
Shruti Jose, Priyakrushna Mohanty. © 2024. 20 pages.
Richa Srishti. © 2024. 15 pages.
Aleksei Alipichev, Liudmila Nazarova, Yana Chistova. © 2024. 21 pages.
Mustafa Öztürk Akcaoğlu, Burcu Karabulut Coşkun. © 2024. 18 pages.
Body Bottom