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The Hypercomputational Case for Substance Dualism
Abstract
I'm a dualist; in fact, a substance dualist. Why? Myriad arguments compel me to believe as I do, some going back to Descartes. But some sound arguments for substance dualism are recent; and one of these, a new argument so far as I know, is given herein | one that exploits both the contemporary computational scene, and a long-established continuum of increasingly powerful computation, ranging from varieties \beneath" Turing machines to varieties well beyond them. This argument shows that the hypercomputational nature of human cognition implies that Descartes was right all along. Encapsulated, the implication runs as follows: If human persons are physical, then they are their brains (plus, perhaps, other central-nervous-system machinery; denote the composite object by `brains+'). But brains+, as most in AI and related fields correctly maintain, are information processors no more powerful than Turing machines. Since human persons hypercompute (i.e., they process information in ways beyond the reach of Turing machines), it follows that they aren't physical, i.e., that substance dualism holds. Needless to say, objections to this argument are considered and rebutted.
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