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Does It Pay Off for Mayors to Accurately Manage Finance on Municipalities?: The Case of Portugal
Abstract
Under the premise of rationality, politicians behave to maximize re-election probability. Favorable macroeconomic contexts, alignment with central governance, and balanced public finance will be rewarded leading to re-election. Logit estimations applied to Portuguese municipalities in the period 2002-2017 fail to empirically support these theoretical effects, providing no incentive-controlled policy actions. Local voters do not punish mayors for the adverse economic performance, staying loyal to ideological voting geographically and over time. Only turnout punishes incumbents over the entire period. The introduction of the law of limitation of terms did not change the incentives towards wise governance; therefore, lack of electoral punishments to undesirable policy actions withstands the potential misconduct of incumbents. Existing evidence points to the need of reforms in what concerns electoral participation as when we compel voters to express their democratic rights, they become more critical to undesirable achievements.
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