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Overconfident CEO Appointments: Determinants and Consequences on Competitors

Overconfident CEO Appointments: Determinants and Consequences on Competitors
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Author(s): Neslihan Yilmaz (Bogazici University, Turkey)
Copyright: 2015
Pages: 15
Source title: Handbook of Research on Behavioral Finance and Investment Strategies: Decision Making in the Financial Industry
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Zeynep Copur (Hacettepe University, Turkey)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-7484-4.ch026

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the determinants of overconfident CEO appointments and the effect these appointments on competitor stock performance during managerial turnover within the firm. It also analyzes the turnovers that take place in S&P 500 firms and find that an overconfident successor appointed to the firm pertains to a significant positive impact on competitor's stock price. The author also finds that when the outgoing CEO is overconfident it is more likely for the firm to have an overconfident successor.

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