Application of Game Theory for Network Recovery After Large-Scale Disasters

View Sample PDF

Author(s): Bo Gu (Kogakuin University, Japan)and Osamu Mizuno (Kogakuin University, Japan)
Copyright: 2018
Pages: 20
Source title: Smart Technologies for Emergency Response and Disaster Management
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Zhi Liu (Waseda University, Japan)and Kaoru Ota (Muroran Institute of Technology, Japan)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-2575-2.ch008

Keywords: Business Science Reference / Crisis Response and Management / Emergency & Disaster Management / Government & Law

Purchase

View Application of Game Theory for Network Recovery After Large-Scale Disasters on the publisher's website for pricing and purchasing information.

Abstract

In recent years, large-scale disasters took place frequently and always caused severe damages to the network infrastructures. Due to these damages, available network resources are usually not sufficient to meet the data transmission requirements of users after disasters. Moreover, users tend to behave selfishly by consuming as much network resources as possible. Incentive mechanisms are therefore essential for the users to voluntarily cooperate with each other and improve the system performance. In commercial networks, this can be efficiently achieved through pricing. Namely, by selecting an appropriate pricing policy, it is able to incentivize users to choose the service that best matches their data transmission demands. In this chapter, assuming that a time-dependent pricing scheme is imposed on network users, a Stackelberg leader-follower game is then formulated to study the joint utility optimization problem of the users in a disaster region subject to maximum delay and storage constrains. The equilibrium for the Stackelberg leader-follower game is also investigated.

The IRMA Community

Research IRM

Application of Game Theory for Network Recovery After Large-Scale Disasters

Purchase

Abstract

Related Content

IRMA Sponsors